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    • Tobias Stoeckmann's avatar
      Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data · f7a547b7
      Tobias Stoeckmann authored
      
      
      If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
      possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
      IPC message.
      
      The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
      short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
      small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
      
      When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
      and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
      exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
      abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
      the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
      f7a547b7
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